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Abstract
Promoting competition in domestic markets is very often an important policy
concern of governments in context of developmental objectives. Direct government
intervention of different forms to promote competition becomes all the more nec-
essary especially in the markets that have higher tendencies to concentrate. For
example, in the market for telecom spectrum licenses, many countries impose ceil-
ings on the number of licenses that a single individual company can possess. It
is commonly believed that in the markets where permission from government is
required for fresh operation or expansion of operation, e.g. through licenses, larger
number of licenses lead to higher competition. But some earlier literature show
that increasing the number of licenses might actually be detrimental to competi-
tion contrary to popular belief. This paper considers a situation where there is an
incumbent monopolist in a market; the government is auctioning two new licenses,
one for this same market and another one for a completely new market where no
firm had been operating so far. A number of potential entrants are willing to bid
for both the licenses. The incumbent firm is allowed to purchase only one of these
licenses. If it purchases the license for its own market it can retain its monopoly
position. The selling procedure dictates that only the potential entrants will be
bidding and in order to purchase the license in its existing market, the incumbent
monopolist has to match the highest bid in that auction. Alternatively, it can bid
for the entry license for the new market. This paper tries to identify under what
conditions the incumbent firm will bid for the outside market. It also tries to find
under what conditions providing some other options to the incumbent firm leads to
increased competition in the existing market, thus contributing to developmental
prospects by enhancing social welfare.
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1 Introduction
It is broadly believed that development of an economy depends to a large extent on
its market organisation (Stiglitz(1989))[5]. Simple economic intuitions suggest that the
higher the degree of competition in markets, the lower would be the amount of dead weight
loss. This view is supported by Cowling and Mueller (1978)[1]. Thus higher competition
leads to higher social welfare. Generally in less developed countries, markets are not well
organised. In such cases, direct government intervention becomes necessary to ensure
competition. The role of government becomes more important especially in context of
those markets where entry or expansion of existing operation require permission from
the government, e.g. the market for telecommunications services, mining activities etc.
Such permissions are usually obtained through licenses. As noted by Hoppe, Jehiel and
Moldovanu (2006)[2], market structure in an industry is shaped by license auctions. It
is believed commonly that by offering a higher number of licenses, the government can
ensure more competition in an industry. But Hoppe, Jehiel and Moldovanu (2006)[2]
establish that this is not the case always, a higher number of licenses not necessarily
enhances competition, and in fact, as their analysis suggests, a higher number of licenses
may keep the market more concentrated.
We must note here, that some markets have higher tendencies to concentrate than others
due to advantages of incumbents from the concerned activities1. The market for telecom-
munications services is one of them. This is why in various countries the governments
adopt different policy measures to prevent concentration of the telecom markets. For ex-
ample the Government of India sets ceilings on the number of licenses that a single bidding
firm can win in the telecom license auctions2. In UK, the Government had reserved a
particular license only for the new entrants, and thus no incumbent was permitted to bid
for it3.
We consider a case where there is a single firm operating as a monopolist in a market,
where fresh operation or any expansion of the existing operation are both subject to
licensing. There is a fresh market, where no firm has been operational so far. The
government is going to offer two licenses, one for the existing market and another one
for the fresh market, through auction. There are potential bidders for both these licenses
other than the incumbent. Now, the government has imposed ceilings on the number
of licenses that a single firm can hold. Due to this ceiling, the incumbent firm can get
hold of any one of these licenses. The selling procedure dictates, that only the potential
entrants will be bidding for the license in the market where the incumbent monopolist
1As observed by Klemperer (2004)[4], promoting competition in British telecom spectrum auctions was
an important objective and new entrants needed to be encouraged in order to ensure their participation
in the telecom spectrum auctions.
2Internship Report, Competition Commission of India (May, 2012)[3].
3Klemperer (2004)[4].
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operates. In order to win the license in its existing market, the incumbent has to match
the highest bid among those submitted by the potential entrants. For the license for
the fresh market, however, all the firms will be bidding.If the incumbent firm wins the
license for its existing market, then it can retain its monopoly there. If it instead wins the
license for the fresh market, its existing market becomes duopolisitic, while it becomes a
monopolist in the fresh market. One important fact to note here is that, under both the
situations mentioned above, for the industry as a whole, only two firms operate, if the
incumbent wins any one of the licenses; however, when the incumbent wins the license
for its existing market, the industry consists of two monopoly markets, while when the
incumbent firm wins the license for the fresh market, its existing market turns more
competitive by becoming a duopoly. Thus in the latter case,the industry as a whole is
more competitive.
This paper, in terms of a very simple model, makes an attempt to identify under what
conditions the incumbent will be interested to bid for the license for the fresh market. It
also tries to find under what conditions providing some other options to the incumbent
firm leads to increased competition in the existing market, thus contributing to devel-
opmental prospects by enhancing social welfare. The following Section 2 discusses the
model and the policy implications and Section 3 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
We assume that there are two markets, viz. market A and market B. The inverse
demand function of market A is PA = aA − QA and that of market B is PB = aB − QB
respectively, where QA and QB are the market outputs and aA > 0 and aB > 0. In
market A there is currently only one firm enjoying monopoly; we denote this firm as firm
I. In market B, no firm is operating currently. The marginal cost of firm I in market
A is cA > 0. If firm I gets the right to operate in market B then her marginal cost will
be cB > 0. Government is auctioning two licenses, one for market A and another one
for market B. There are NA > 1 potential bidders for market A and NB > 1 potential
bidders for market B. The marginal cost of each of these bidders is private information
to the concerned bidder. Although it is common knowledge that these marginal costs
of the new entrants in market A are distributed according to the distribution function
F[A](·) and the density function f[A](·) over the interval [c[A], c[A]] and has full support. It
is also common knowledge that the marginal costs of the new entrants in market B are
distributed according to the distribution function F[B](·) and the density function f[B](·)
over the interval [c[B], c[B]] and has full support. Firm I can either bid for market B or
she can outbid the highest bidder in market A to retain her monopoly. In the second case
Government will disclose the highest bid to firm I and ask whether she wants to pay the
amount and obtain the license. If firm I agrees to pay the amount to the Government,
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then she retains her monopoly. Otherwise one new firm will enter the market and thus
market A becomes a duopoly market. However, firm I cannot bid in market B and
outbid the new entrant in market A simultaneously. So she has to decide whether to bid
for market B or outbid the new entrant before the auctions start. In all the cases the
Government will declare all the bids after the auction.
Let us assume that a new entrant will participate in the auction if the marginal cost of
that new entrant is less than or equal to cˆA
4. Similarly, we assume that the incumbent
firm will bid in market B if her marginal cost for market B is less than or equal to cˆB
5.
We know that cA ≤ cˆA ≤ cA, accordingly we define
• G[A](z | cˆA ) :=
(
1− F[A](z)
F[A](cˆA)
)NA−1
, as the conditional probability of winning of a po-
tential entrant bidding firm in market A, given that the threshold value of marginal
cost is cˆA, when the firm is signaling her type to be z,
and
• H[A](z | cˆA ) :=
(
1− F[A](z)
F[A](cˆA)
)NA
as the conditional probability distribution of the
lowest order statistic among the types of new entrants bidding for the license for
market A given that the threshold value of marginal cost for market A is cˆA
6.
The current monopoly profit of firm I in market A is given by Π
[A]
IM(cA) =
(
aA−cA
2
)2
.
The monopoly profit in market B, if firm I bids for market B and wins the auction, is
given by Π
[B]
IM(cB) =
(
aB−cB
2
)27. Let us denote the new entrant in market A by firm N .
Suppose the marginal cost of the new entrant in market A is cN > 0. The profit of firm I
in market A then is Π
[A]
ID(cA, cN) =
(
aA−2cA+cN
3
)2
. The profit of firm N in market A then
is Π
[A]
ND(cA, cN) =
(
aA−2cN+cA
3
)28.
2.1 Incumbent chooses to outbid in market A
If the incumbent firm does not bid for entry in market B and decides to outbid the
new entrant in market A, then two factors need to be considered. First if the new
entrant bids more than
[
Π
[A]
IM(cA)− Π[A]ID(cA, cN)
]
the incumbent firm cannot outbid the
bidder. And second the probability that the incumbent firm is not bidding for market B is(
1− F[B](cˆB)
)
. Let us denote by O
[A]
ND(cA, cN , cˆB) :=
(
1− F[B](cˆB)
) [
Π
[A]
IM(cA)− Π[A]ID(cA, cN)
]
,
4We refer to this value of marginal cost cˆA as threshold value of marginal cost for market A subse-
quently.
5We refer to this value of marginal cost cˆB as threshold value of marginal cost for market B subse-
quently.
6The conditional probabilities G[A](z | cˆA ) and H[A](z | cˆA ) have been written for simplicity as G[A](z)
and H[A](z) respectively in the subsequent analysis.
7These monopoly profits can be calculated routinely.
8These duopoly profits can be calculated by the routine method for Cournot competition involving
two firms with constant but different marginal costs.
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which is the minimum bid that the new entrant must quote. It leads to the following
lemma.
Lemma 2.1. A new entrant will participate in the auction only if her type is less than
or equal to cˆA.
Π
[A]
ND(cA, cˆA) = O
[A]
ND(cA, cˆA, cˆB)
The above lemma determines the value of cA as a function of cB. We will determine the
value of cB as a function of cA in the next section. Together, both cA and cB will be
determined uniquely. However note that cA can be calculated by any agent including the
Government. So it becomes common knowledge.
Since all the bidders in market A knows that no bidder has marginal cost greater than cA,
if a bidder bids as if her marginal cost is z, her winning probability is given by G[A](z).
Therefore, the expected profit function of the new entrant is given by[
Π
[A]
ND(cA, cN)− b[A](z)
]
G[A](z)
where b[A](·) is the symmetric and decreasing equilibrium bid function of the new entrant.
The objective of the new entrant is to maximize this expected profit function, subject
to the constraint b[A](z) ≥ O[A]ND(cA, cN , cˆB). Note that this constraint will act as a self
imposed reserve price which is a function of the new entrant’s own type (i.e. each bidder
will face different reserve prices) so this auction in effect becomes an auction with dynamic
reserve prices.
The following proposition derives the symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy of a new
entrant.
Proposition 2.2. The symmetric and decreasing equilibrium bidding strategy of a new
entrant is given by
b[A](cA, cN , cˆA, cˆB) = O
[A]
ND(cA, cN , cˆB)−
1
G[A](cN)
∫ cˆA
cN
[
Π
[A]
ND(cA, z)−O[A]ND(cA, z, cˆB)
]
dG[A](z)
Proof. The proof of this proposition is provided in the Appendix A.
2.2 Incumbent bidding for license to enter market B
Here we are assuming that the incumbent firm is bidding in market B. Our objective
is to find cˆB. It is important to assume that in market B all the other firms do not
know that the incumbent firm is already operating in market A. So, all the other firms
perceive the incumbent firm to be just another regular firm participating in the auction.
The expected profit of the incumbent firm if she decides to bid in market B and bids as
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if her real marginal cost is z is given by
EΠ
[B]
IM(z, cB) =
(
Π
[B]
IM(cB)− b(z)
) (
1− F[B](z)
)NB
We are interested in symmetric and decreasing equilibrium bidding strategy. The follow-
ing proposition not only shows that such an equilibrium strategy exists, but also explicitly
derives the form of this bidding strategy.
Proposition 2.3. The corresponding symmetric decreasing equilibrium bid function is
b
[B]
IM(cB) =
−1(
1− F[B](cB)
)NB ∫ cB
cB
Π
[B]
IM(z)d
(
1− F[B](z)
)NB
Proof. The proof of this proposition is provided in the Appendix B.
Next we proceed to calculate the expected profit of the incumbent firm when she chooses
to bid for the license permitting entry into market B. The following lemma does this.
Lemma 2.4. The expected profit of the incumbent firm if she decides to bid for the license
for market B in equilibrium is
EΠ
[B]
IM(cB) = −
cB∫
cB
Π
[B]′
IM (z)
(
1− F[B](z)
)NB dz
Proof. We already know that the expected profit of the incumbent firm in market B
is
(
Π
[B]
IM(cB)− b(cB)
) (
1− F[B](cB)
)NB . Also the symmetric and decreasing equilibrium
bid function is −1
(1−F[B](cB))
NB
∫ cB
cB
Π
[B]
IM(z)d
(
1− F[B](z)
)NB . After substituting for the bid
function in the expected profit function we get(
Π
[B]
IM(cB)−
−1(
1− F[B](cB)
)NB ∫ cB
cB
Π
[B]
IM(z)d
(
1− F[B](z)
)NB)(1− F[B](cB))NB
Simplifying the above equation we get
Π
[B]
IM(cB)
(
1− F[B](cB)
)NB + ∫ cB
cB
Π
[B]
IM(z)d
(
1− F[B](z)
)NB
Finally after integrating by parts we get the result.
The above expected profit is one part of the opportunity cost of not bidding in market
B. Note that Π
[B]′
IM (·) < 0, therefore, EΠ[B]IM(cB) is positive. If the incumbent firm does
not bid in market B and outbid in market A then her expected payment is the expected
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highest bid of the new entrant, which is given by
Eb
[A]
ND(cA, cˆA, cˆB) =
∫ cˆA
cA
b[A](cA, cN , cˆA, cˆB)dH[A](cN)
This is another part of the opportunity cost of not bidding for the license for market B.
Finally, the expected profit of the duopoly is given by
EΠ
[A]
ID(cA) =
∫ cˆA
cA
Π
[A]
ID(cA, cN)dH[A](cN)
If firm I bids for the license for market B then her expected profit is the sum of the
expected duopoly profit and the expected profit in market B. However, otherwise her
expected profit is the monopoly profit minus the expected highest bid. So, firm I will
bid in market B if the first one is greater than the second one. This is formally stated in
the next proposition.
Proposition 2.5. The incumbent firm will not bid in market B if
Π
[A]
IM(cA)− Eb[A]ND(cA, cˆA, cˆB) ≥ EΠ[A]ID(cA) + EΠ[B]IM(cB)
We know firm I is indifferent between bidding and not bidding in market B if her marginal
cost in market B is cˆB. The final lemma below establishes cˆB as a function of cˆA.
Lemma 2.6.
Π
[A]
IM(cA)− Eb[A]ND(cA, cˆA, cˆB) = EΠ[A]ID(cA) + EΠ[B]IM(cˆB)
From Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 2.6 we have two equations and two unknowns (viz. cˆA and
cˆB). So we can solve for the values uniquely.
2.3 Policy implications
Government knows all the distribution functions and cA, though cB and the marginal cost
of any new entrant are completely unknown to the Government. However, Government
can still calculate cˆA and cˆB. Some important policy implications emerge from the above
analysis.
First, we know that the Government’s objective is to enhance competition at the existing
monopoly market, i.e. market A, but not with firms who have marginal costs higher
than cˆA (let us refer to the firms with marginal cost below or equal to cˆA efficient and
the firms with marginal costs above cˆA inefficient). In this mechanism, neither any direct
reserve price is set by the Government, nor is any license reserved exclusively for the new
entrants. Therefore, if any new entrant actually wins the license for market A, that firm
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is definitely an efficient one, whose marginal cost is not too high as per Government’s
intended standard. Thus, competition is enhanced in this case involving efficient firms.
Instead, had there been a direct reserve price such that the incumbent does not bid for
the license for market A at all, that might have failed to satisfy the individual rationality
constraints (i.e. participation constraints) of the new entrants as well. In that case the
license would have remained unallocated, thus resulting in a socially inefficient outcome.
Alternatively, in case of reservation of license for new entrants only, it might very well
happen that all the potential entrants are actually quite inefficient in terms of very high
marginal costs. Then also the resulting allocation would have been socially inefficient
in the sense that the best among the lot is not good enough. As noted earlier in this
mechanism we effectively have a dynamic reserve price which is a function of the bidder’s
own type. Now, fixed reserve prices and dynamic reserve prices have different effects on
bidders. For fixed reserve prices, the profit margin that the firms enjoy is lower than
what they enjoy under dynamic reserve price. So the firms prefer dynamic reserve prices
over fixed ones. Thus the Government is no worse off and the firms are better off under
such a reserve price, and we can say that there is a Pareto improvement in a way due to
this dynamic reserve price.
The second implication relates to the knowledge of cˆB. Here we have considered only one
additional market (B) along with the existing monopoly market (A). The results derived
suggest that cˆA is functionally related to cˆB. Now, let us consider the case where there
are more additional markets. For simplicity, let us consider just one more additional
market C. and let cˆC be the marginal cost, such that the incumbent will participate in
the auction of license for entry into market C if her marginal cost is below this value.
The Government can calculate both cˆB and cˆC . Now, if the Government intends that the
incumbent bids for license in any other market, then it has the choice to offer the license
for the market that has a higher threshold value (i.e. cˆ value) above which the incumbent
will not bid for the license for the concerned market. A higher cˆ value for a fresh market
provides more incentive to the incumbent since it involves a higher probability of winning
for the incumbent9. Thus the knowledge of cˆi values can help the Government design an
incentive compatible mechanism, for which the incumbent chooses to bid for an outside
market in its own interest allowing for more competition in its existing market.
The third implication relates again to the knowledge of the threshold value of marginal
cost in outside markets. If the Government wants the new entrant in market A to be
very efficient, then the Government will try to keep the threshold value of marginal cost
above which no new entrant participates in the auction in market A (i.e. cˆA) low. The
Government can do so quite easily by offering the license for that alternative outside
9This means to say that as Fi(cˆi) (where i = B,C) increases with higher values of cˆi, the probability
that the incumbent will not bid for the entry license for market i given by (1− F[i](cˆi) decreases.
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market which has a lower threshold value of marginal cost10. In that case if any new
entrant wins the license for market A, that firm will definitely have quite low marginal
cost.
The analysis above suggests that the Government is able to ensure competition in a
monopoly market and that too with more efficient firms (efficient as defined above) with
a higher probability than the commonly used alternative policies like setting reserve price
or reserving licenses for new entrants. Reserve price, even if it succeeds in making an
efficient firm enter the existing monopoly market, can do so with less probability. In case
of reserving some license for new entrants, the entering firm might very well be one with
very high marginal cost, i.e.inefficient in our defined sense.
Thus we observe that the Government can fulfill more than one policy objectives with a
single policy instrument in our specified mechanism. We must note a few more aspects of
this mechanism here. First, as mentioned above, this mechanism can successfully work if
we consider many additional markets. Second, the prevailing structure of the additional
market (i.e. whether there is no firm, or there is monopoly or oligopoly) is not decisive
about the outcomes. Thus the assumptions we have made here about a single outside
market where no firm is operating prior to the license auction are merely simplifying
assumptions without any loss of generality and so this mechanism can be successfully
extended to a much more general framework. However, market A being a monopoly is a
crucial assumption.
An implicit implication of this analysis is that the government can, with some commonly
used policy tools like tax concession or provision of subsidy, provide incentives to the
incumbent monopolist so that it does not feel interested to outbid the potential entrants
and attain the same outcome as suggested by the mechanism discussed in this paper. Even
in the cases of tax concession or subsidy the inefficiency problems, which are inherent
in case of setting reserve prices or reserving licenses for new entrants can be avoided.
Thus the Government can enjoy a lot of flexibilities in the policy making, in terms of
both choosing the policy instruments as well as directions and get more than objectives
fulfilled at the same time with much less direct intervention in the market operation.
3 Conclusion
Promoting competition in domestic markets has remained an important policy objective
for many governments across the world. Direct government intervention becomes all the
more necessary especially for the markets those are more prone to concentrate. In order
to ensure competition in markets where there are just single firms or a few large firms, the
governments often try to provide incentives to new entrants so that they feel interested
10This can be done since cˆA is function of the threshold value of the outside market.
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to enter those markets. Governments can control these entries directly for markets where
any fresh operation or expansion of existing operation requires government’s permission
in the form of licenses. Auction is regarded largely an effective way of allocating such
licenses. As discussed earlier in the paper, the governments can reserve certain licenses for
the new entrants, forbidding the incumbents to bid for these licenses. If the governments
can calculate the price of the licenses which will definitely discourage the incumbents from
bidding, then the government can also set that level of price as the reserve price. But
as discussed above, both these policy instruments involve some amount of inefficiency.
This paper has therefore proposed an alternative mechanism for allocating licenses that
involves much less direct intervention by the government in the market operations with
higher probabilities of efficiency in the system and much more flexible policy choices. The
proposed policy here deals with a situation where an incumbent monopolist can choose
to outbid any new entrant in its existing market or bid for a license allowing entry to an
outside market. Further research question in this direction lies in analysing a situation
where the incumbent is first asked to quote a bid for a new license in its own market
and the potential entrants are given the option to match this bid. The fundamental
difference between the current and this proposed analysis lies in the fact that in the
current analysis, the potential entrants do not get to know the type of the incumbent
prior to submitting their own bids, but in the proposed mechanism, they obtain this
information before bidding. It will be interesting to compare the outcomes under these
two different types of specifications and figure out under what conditions the government
will choose one policy over the other.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 2.2
Note that the equilibrium bid function must consist of two components, one for the
incumbent firm and one for the other competitors. The firm must bid O
[A]
ND(cA, cN , cˆB),
otherwise the incumbent firm may outbid her. Therefore, the remaining profit for entering
the market is Π
[A]
ND(cA, z) − O[A]ND(cA, z, cˆB). The rest of the proof is similar to the proof
of proportion 2.3 noting that ∂O
[A]
ND(cA, cN , cˆB)/∂cN < 0.
B Proof of Proposition 2.3
The objective of the incumbent firm is to maximize EΠ
[B]
IM(z, cB) by choosing z. The first
order condition of this maximization is given by
Π
[B]
IM(cB)d
(
1− F[B](z)
)NB = d [b(z) (1− F[B](z))NB]
At a symmetric equilibrium bidding according to her true type is optimal. So, at equi-
librium we have
Π
[B]
IM(cB)d
(
1− F[B](cB)
)NB = d [b(cB) (1− F[B](cB))NB] (B.1)
First Fundamental Theorem of Calculus gives
b
[B]
IM(cB) =
−1(
1− F[B](cB)
)NB ∫ cB
cB
Π
[B]
IM(z)d
(
1− F[B](z)
)NB
To check the second order condition for this maximization, note that
EΠ
[B]′
IM (z, cB) = Π
[B]
IM(cB)d
(
1− F[B](z)
)NB − d [b(z) (1− F[B](z))NB]
From equation B.1 we know at equilibrium
d
[
b(z)
(
1− F[B](z)
)NB] = Π[B]IM(z)d (1− F[B](z))NB
So
EΠ
[B]′
IM (z, cB) =
[
Π
[B]
IM(cB)− Π[B]IM(z)
]
d
(
1− F[B](z)
)NB
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Note that EΠ
[B]′
IM (z, cB) Q 0 if cB Q z. So EΠ
[B]
IM(z, cB) is indeed maximized at z = cB
Finally, we have to show that b
[B]′
IM (cB) < 0. To show this, first, we do an integration-by-
parts and get
b
[B]
IM(cB) = Π
[B]
IM(cB) +
1(
1− F[B](cB)
)NB ∫ cB
cB
Π
[B]′
IM (z)
(
1− F[B](z)
)NB dz
Therefore,
b
[B]′
IM (cB) =
[∫ cB
cB
Π
[B]′
IM (z)
(
1− F[B](z)
)NB dz][ d
dcB
1(
1− F[B](cB)
)NB
]
First note that as Π
[B]′
IM (z) < 0 we have
∫ cB
cB
Π
[B]′
IM (z)
(
1− F[B](z)
)NB dz < 0. And second
d
dcB
1
(1−F[B](cB))
NB
> 0. So, b
[B]′
IM (cB) < 0 as desired.
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